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In 1968 the late Chief Justice Bell with the concurrence of the
other Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established a
Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions. He directed
the member judges and lawyers to formulate pattern jury instruc-
tions for Common Pleas trials. From that date a criminal instruc-
tions subcommittee has worked at preparing form charges for
criminal cases. The individual instructions have been made avail-
able to all Common Pleas Judges as soon as approved by the sub-
committee. By 1979, the subcommittee had finished a
comprehensive collection of pattern instructions. They were pub-
lished late that year by the Pennsylvania Bar Institute in a single
loose-leaf volume.' The individual instructions and their companion
notes must be kept up-to-date. The author as reporter to the crimi-
nal instructions subcommittee recently completed drafts of a revised
set of murder and manslaughter charges. They are reprinted here
with the permission of the subcommittee. The drafts may be of gen-
eral interest for their own content and as examples of the work being
done by the subcommittee.
There is another reason for publishing these nascent criminal
homicide instructions. The members of the Committee for Proposed
Standard Jury Instructions and its subcommittees welcome the com-
ments of the judges and lawyers who read or use their handiwork. It
is hoped that dissemination at this time will not only lead to useful
criticism of the murder and manslaughter charges themselves, but
will also encourage future suggestions about other instructions.2
* B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, 1946; L.L.B.(J.D.) Harvard Law
School, 1952; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
1. Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions. Available through
PBI, P.O. Box 1027, Harrisburg, PA 17108.
2. Criticism and suggestions may be addressed to the author at Dickinson School of
Law, Carlisle, PA 17013.
It has always been understood that the instructions produced by
the Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions are intended
to be a resource. They are not to be regarded as officially adopted by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The instructions and the accom-
panying subcommittee notes are meant to save the time of trial
judges and attorneys, to reduce the need for legal research and draft-
ing and to facilitate the preparation of legally correct and easily un-
derstood jury instructions in every case. The individual instructions
are building blocks, each dealing with one or more matters. In rou-
tine cases all a judge who chooses to use them should have to do is
select the correct blocks, make simple changes to shape each block to
the facts of the particular case and his personal style and put the
blocks together to form a coherent jury charge. In unusual cases the
court, with the help of counsel, has to do more research and be more
creative when shaping, assembling and supplementing the instruc-
tional blocks.
The criteria for a good pattern instruction are implicit in the
preceding description of the purposes and use of the suggested jury
instructions.3 Each instruction should be legally correct. It should
be objective, not unduly slanted towards either the Commonwealth
or the defendant. The instruction should be complete. This does not
mean that every instruction must be complete in itself. It is often
convenient to refer the judge, through the subcommittee notes, to
other instructions or to the statute for infrequently used definitions
and defenses. The instruction should be brief. It should concentrate
on essentials, covering the subject simply and lucidly. It should gen-
erally be left to the judge to tailor the charge to the facts, to elabo-
rate, reiterate and provide examples. All instructions should employ
a sufficiently uniform vocabulary and style so that each of them can
readily be combined with others. Finally, the language used should
be suitable to the occasion. The choice of language should be one
that holds the jurors' attention and is readily comprehended yet does
not detract from the dignity of the proceedings. Obviously, every
one of these criteria cannot be fully realized in every instruction.
For example, when writing pattern instructions for murder and man-
slaughter, the complexity of the subject may require some sacrifice of
brevity and perhaps lucidity in favor of an accurate statement of the
law. Quaere whether the draft murder-manslaughter instructions
come as close as they might to satisfying the subcommittees' own
criteria for good pattern instructions?
The subcommittee experimented with commentary of differing
3. For the history, merits and demerits of pattern instructions generally and for practi-
cal advice on carrying out a pattern drafting project, see McBRIDE, THE ART OF INSTRUCTING
THE JURY, §§ 9.01-11.07 (1969).
scope before settling on the current form of subcommittee note. The
note to each instruction typically explains how and when the instruc-
tion is to be used and includes a limited amount of basic information
about the area of law to which the instruction relates. The citation
and discussion of legal authority are intended to identify the statu-
tory and case law sources of the instruction and to provide guidance
and research leads that may be helpful in framing additional instruc-
tions, ruling on evidence questions, and dealing with other common
issues in the area involved.
Where important legal questions are unsettled or the merits of
particular practices are debatable the subcommittee notes will often
identify the issues and indicate the alternative answers. See for ex-
ample (i) the treatment of the jury's power to convict of a lesser
crime in the subcommittee note to Instruction 15.2501B, (ii) the han-
dling of malice as an element of second degree murder in the sub-
committee note to Instruction 15.2502B, and (iii) the discussion of
whether an intent to seriously injure is sufficient for voluntary man-
slaughter in the subcommittee note to Instruction 15.2503A.
It should be emphasized that the instructions and subcommittee
notes that follow are still at the reporter's draft stage. They have not
yet been refined and approved by the subcommittee.
15.2501A (Crim) CRIMINAL HOMICIDE-INTRODUCTION
(1) The defendant is charged with a criminal homicide, that is,
with taking the life of - without lawful justification or ex-
cuse. There are (five) ( - ) types of criminal homicide that you
might possibly find in this case. They are (murder of the first degree)
(murder of the second degree) (murder of the third degree) (volun-
tary manslaughter) (involuntary manslaughter). It will be your duty
to decide whether or not to find the defendant guilty of any of these
crimes.
(2) The term "malice" is a word which I shall use frequently.
Malice when used in the law of criminal homicide has a special
meaning. It does not mean simply hatred, spite or ill-will. The word
malice is a shorthand way of referring to any of various bad mental
states or attitudes which a person who kills must have for the killing
to be murder. The difference between murder and manslaughter lies
in the presence or absence of malice. A killing with malice is mur-
der. A killing is with malice and is therefore murder if it is without
lawful justification, excuse or circumstances mitigating the killing to
manslaughter, and the killer acted with one of the following states of
mind: an intent to kill or an intent to inflict serious bodily harm or a
wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of
consequences and a mind regardless of social duty, indicating an un-
justified disregard for the probability of death or great bodily harm
and an extreme indifference to the value of human life.
(3) I shall now instruct you on the elements of each type of
criminal homicide that you might possibly find in this case.
Subcommittee Note
This instruction should serve as an appropriate introduction to
criminal homicide charges in many cases. The court should list in
subdivision (1) the degrees of murder and manslaughter for which
the jury may properly convict the defendant taking into account the
formal accusation and the law of lesser offenses. On the question of
when should the court instruct on a lesser type homicide not specifi-
cally alleged in the charges, see Subcommittee Note to Instruction
2501B. Subdivision (2) which defines malice is only needed when
murder is a permissible verdict.
This introduction is a good place for general observations.
Crime Code § 2502 as amended by Act 39 (1978), § 2503 and § 2504
which define murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary man-
slaughter have made few changes in the law of criminal homicide.
Much of the pre-Crimes Code Pennsylvania case law remains rele-
vant. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allen, 475 Pa. 165, 379 A.2d 1335
(1977) (felony murder case); Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430,
378 A.2d 1189 (1977) (involuntary manslaughter case; general dis-
cussion of criminal homicide under Crimes Code).
Subdivision (2) of this instruction is based on long established
Pennsylvania case law. Crimes Code § 2502(c), by defining third de-
gree murder as "all other kinds of murder," imports the traditional
concept and definition of malice into the Crimes Code. For cases
supporting the definition of malice in subdivision (2) see, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868); Commonwealth v. Chermansky,
430 Pa. 170, 242 A.2d 237 (1968). A briefer definition may be found
in the case of Commonwealth v. Hare, 486 Pa. 123, 404 A.2d 388
(1979): "Malice will be found if the actor committed a killing with
an intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm, or consciously dis-
regarded an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions
might cause death or serious bodily harm."
15.2501B (Crim) CRIMINAL HOMICIDE-FINDING LESSER
TYPE
(1) I have defined the elements of the (five) ( ) types of
criminal homicide that you might possibly find in this case. Begin-
ning with the most serious, they are in order of seriousness (first de-
gree murder) (second degree murder) (third degree murder)
(voluntary manslaughter) (involuntary manslaughter).
(2) If you intend to hold the defendant fully accountable for his
conduct then you should find him guilty of the most serious kind of
criminal homicide, if any, which you are satisfied has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, you do have the power to be
lenient. You may find the defendant guilty of any one of the lesser
types of criminal homicide so long as you are satisfied beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that he is guilty of a more serious type.
Subcommittee Note
This instruction is appropriate when there are more than two
possible types of criminal homicide open to the jury. The instruction
would be somewhat stilted and should be reworded for a case with
only two possible guilty verdicts. This instruction should be given
immediately after the court defines the various types of homicide.
The question of when the court should instruct on each of the vari-
ous types of homicide as a permissible finding is dealt with later in
this note.
In many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, the courts seem
to be ambivalent about the jury's power to return a verdict of a lesser
homicide when a greater one has been proven. Some judges regard
this mercy power as highly desirable--one of the safeguards and glo-
ries of the Anglo-American system of justice. Others see the power
as a troublesome incident of the jury's ultimate control of the verdict.
Judges have differed accordingly on when and how the jury should
be apprised of its power. This judicial disagreement underlies the
difficulties that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has had in settling
questions of when juries should be charged on lesser offenses in
homicide trials. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, - Pa. _, 415
A.2d 403 (1980); Commonwealth v. Whield, 474 Pa. 27, 376 A.2d
617 (1977).
Subdivision (2) confronts the jury squarely with its options--to
hold the defendant strictly accountable or to be lenient. The instruc-
tion is neutral; it does not favor either alternative. The subcommit-
tee believes that this straightforward approach is understandable to
jurors and supportable under the case law. The court can let counsel
argue the relative merits of the jury's two options. Some judges may
hesitate to use an instruction which leaves the impression that strict
accountability and leniency are equally worthy alternatives. In the
opinion of the subcommittee it would be legally acceptable for the
trial court to add the following remarks:
In my opinion the ends of justice are best served when juries
make it a general practice to hold defendants fully accountable for
their crimes and save their power to return lenient verdicts for
exceptional cases. A general practice of full accountability pro-
motes observance of the law and respect for the law. It helps as-
sure equal treatment for all defendants. Verdicts do not depend
upon the chance attitude of each jury. Mind you, I am only giving
my opinion about accountability. You are not bound to follow it.
When should the court instruct on a lesser homicide not specifi-
cally charged in the indictment or information? It seems clear that
the court should instruct on third degree murder when the defendant
is charged with murder of the first or second degree regardless of
whether there is a rational basis in the evidence for finding that de-
gree, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. McNeal, 456 Pa. 394, 319 A.2d 669
(1974); Commonwealth v. Collins, 436 Pa. 114, 259 A.2d 160 (1969);
Commonwealth v. Meas, 415 Pa. 41, 202 A.2d 74 (1964). It has been
held that the court should charge on voluntary manslaughter when-
ever a defendant who is charged with murder requests such a charge
regardless of whether there is a rational basis in the evidence for
finding voluntary manslaughter, see Commonwealth v. Scaramuz-
zino, 485 Pa. 513, 403 A.2d 82 (1979) and cases cited therein. It has
also been held that in a murder prosecution, an involuntary man-
slaughter charge shall be given only when requested, and where the
offense has been made an issue in the case and the trial evidence
reasonably would support such a verdict, Commonwealth v. Williams,
supra, Commonwealth v. White, - Pa. -, 415 A.2d 399 (1980). It ap-
pears that this rule should extend to cases where the defendant is
charged with voluntary manslaughter, see Commonwealth v. Terrell,
482 Pa. 303, 393 A.2d 1117 (1978).
15.2501C (Crim) CRIMINAL HOMICIDE--CAUSATION
(1) You cannot find that the defendant killed - unless
you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's
conduct was a direct cause of his death.
[(2) In order to be a direct cause of a death, a person's conduct
must be a direct and substantial factor in bringing about the death.
There can be more than one direct cause of a death. A defendant
who is a direct cause of a death may be criminally liable even though
there are other direct causes.]
[(3) A defendant is not a direct cause of a death if (the actions of
the victim) (the actions of a third person) (the occurrence of another
event) ( ) plays such an independent, important and overriding role
in bringing about the death, compared with the role of the defend-
ant, that the defendant's conduct does not amount to a direct and
substantial factor in bringing about the death.]
[(4) A defendant's conduct may be the direct cause of a death
even though his conduct was not the last or immediate cause of the
death. Thus a defendant's conduct may be the direct cause of a
death if it initiates an unbroken chain of events leading to the death
of the victim.]
[(5) A defendant whose conduct is a direct cause of a death can-
not avoid liability on the grounds that the victim's pre-existing phys-
ical infirmities contributed to his death.]
Subcommittee Note
Subdivision (1) of this instruction is appropriate whenever there
is an issue of whether the defendant's conduct killed the victim, i e.,
was the legal cause of the victim's death. The other subdivisions
may be used singly or in combination when the kind of causation
problems to which they are addressed are present. Where the evi-
dence indicates that the act of an accomplice rather than of the de-
fendant himself may have killed the victim, e.g., in a felony murder
case, these instructions will have to be modified to make the defend-
ant's liability turn on whether the accomplice's conduct was the di-
rect cause of death, see Commonwealth v. Smith, 480 Pa. 524, 391
A.2d 1009 (1979) (in murder prosecution proof that defendant was
accomplice and principal caused death is sufficient for proof of de-
fendant's causation). The causation instruction should be tailored
and related to the facts of the case rather than merely stated as a set
of abstract legal propositions.
Both before and after the enactment of the Crimes Code "direct
cause" was and continues to be the basic test for determining legal
cause in all types of criminal homicide cases, see, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961) (involuntary manslaughter;
direct cause compared with proximate cause); Crimes Code
§ 2504(a); Commonwealth v. Kingsley, 480 Pa. 560, 391 A.2d 1027
(1978) (voluntary manslaughter; legal cause requires direct cause
which is more than "but-for" cause; causation must be proven be-
yond reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Allen, 475 Pa. 165, 379
A.2d 1335 (1977) (felony murder requires showing that slayer's act
was direct cause of death, at footnote 4). Subdivision (1) of the in-
struction requires that the jury find direct cause.
For cases supporting subdivision (2), see Commonwealth v. Mat-
thews, 480 Pa. 33, 389 A.2d 71 (1978) (direct and substantial factor)
and Commonwealth v. Skufca, 222 Pa. Super. 506, 294 A.2d 787
(1972) (defendant's locking her children in room and a subsequent
fire which suffocated children were both direct causes of their death).
Underlying subdivision (3) is the idea that an independent in-
tervening cause, i.e., a supervening cause, is antithetical to direct
cause, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Robinson, 468 Pa. 575, 364 A.2d
665 (1976) (Commonwealth not required to prove that a merely hy-
pothetical supervening event did not take place); Commonwealth v.
Wright, 445 Pa. 480, 317 A.2d 271 (1974) (defendant was not cause
where death resulted from victim's independent actions). The lan-
guage of subdivision (3) while not taken from any case appears to be
consistent with the case law. Although subdivision (3) does not use
the term intervening or supervening cause it gives the jury some use-
ful guidance for deciding a direct cause-supervening cause issue.
For cases supporting subdivision (4) see Commonwealth v. Rob-
ertson, 485 Pa. 586, 403 A.2d 544 (1979) (defendant was cause of
death where victim eventually died of pneumonia while hospitalized
following beating by defendant); Commonwealth v. Robertson, supra.
The rule stated in subdivision (5) can be found in Common-
wealth v. Graves, 484 Pa. 29, 398 A.2d 644 (1979).
It should be recognized that these instructions and the Penn-
sylvania case law from which they are derived, allow the jury sub-
stantial leeway in deciding causation issues. The jury is in effect
called on, while operating within very general guidelines, to make a
moral and social judgment whether the defendant should be held
accountable for the death. It should also be noted that Crimes Code
§ 303(b) and (c) contain some nice principles for determining causa-
tion, which so far as the subcommittee is aware have not been uti-
lized in homicide cases.
15.2502A (Crim) FIRST DEGREE MURDER
(1) You may find the defendant guilty of first degree murder if
you are satisfied that the following three elements have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that - is dead;
Second, that the defendant killed him; and
Third, that the killing was with specific intent to kill and with
malice. A killing is with specific intent to kill if it is willful, deliber-
ate and premeditated, that is, if it is committed by a person who has
a fully formed intent to kill and who is conscious of his own intent.
[More particularly a killing is with specific intent to kill if it is (by
means of poison) (by lying in wait).] As my earlier definition of mal-
ice indicates a killing with the specific intent to kill is also with mal-
ice if it is committed without lawful justification or excuse or
circumstances mitigating the killing to manslaughter.
[(2) You will note that although a defendant must premeditate
in order to have a specific intent to kill, premeditation does not re-
quire planning or previous thought. Premeditation can be very brief.
All that is necessary is that there be time enough so that the defend-
ant has a fully formed intent to kill the victim and is conscious of
that intention.]
[(3) If you believe that the defendant intentionally used a deadly
weapon on a vital part of the victim's body you may regard that as
an item of circumstantial evidence permitting you to infer, if you
choose, that the defendant had the specific intent to kill.]
Subcommittee Note
This instruction is appropriate for use when the defendant is
charged with first degree murder in violation of Crimes Code
§ 2502(a). Subdivision (1) comprises a basic instruction of general
applicability. Subdivision (2) may be used when because of the
"quickness" of the killing there is an issue of whether the defendant
premeditated. Subdivision (3) may be used along with a general in-
struction on proof of intent or state of mind by circumstantial evi-
dence, Instruction 7.02B, when there is evidence tending to show
intentional use of a deadly weapon. Additional instructions may be
needed when there is evidence of certain conditions tending to ne-
gate specific intent to kill, such as drunkenness or drugged condition,
Instruction 8.308B, diminished capacity, 5.01B, or strong emotions,
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 461 Pa. 274, 336 A.2d 282 (1975) (terror
may negate mens rea for first degree murder).
This entire instruction is based on Crimes Code § 2502(a) (defi-
nition of "intentional killing") and on long established Pennsylvania
case law. For cases supporting subdivision (1) see, e.g., Common-
wealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 352 A.2d 30 (1976) (the judicially
developed phrase "specific intent" to kill may be used interchangea-
bly with the statutory language "willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated" to express the same concept; requirements of premeditation
and deliberation are met whenever there is a conscious purpose to
bring about death); Commonwealth v. Stewart, supra, (murder is will-
ful, deliberate and premeditated if murderer is conscious of own pur-
pose and intends to end life of victim). Subdivision (1) is based on
the premise that although malice remains an element of first degree
murder under the Crimes Code, see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 484
Pa. 545, 400 A.2d 583 (1979), Commonwealth v. Butcher, 451 Pa. 57,
304 A.2d 150 (1973) cited with approval in footnote 6 of Common-
wealth v. O'Searo, supra, it is desirable for the judge to limit his defi-
nition of malice relevant to first degree murder.
For a case supporting subdivision (2) see Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 468 Pa. 574, 364 A.2d 665 (1976) (premeditation may be
brief, three minutes). For cases supporting the idea that specific in-
tent to kill is a permissible inference from intentional use of a deadly
weapon on a vital part or from comparable intentional acts of the
defendant, see Commonwealth v. O'Searo, supra, (deadly weapon, vi-
tal part); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 481 Pa. 426, 392 A.2d 1366
(1978) (deadly weapon in general area of vital part); Commonwealth
v. Kingsley, 480 Pa. 560, 391 A.2d 1027 (1978) (repeated kicks to
head of downed victim, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99
S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed. 2d 39 (1979) (inference of intent is constitutional
providing it is permissive and not mandatory). Of course, the jury
should consider all relevant evidence, including the words and con-
duct of the defendant and attending circumstances in deciding
whether or not to infer a specific intent to kill, Commonwealth v. Ash,
482 Pa. 590, 394 A.2d 479 (1978).
15.2502B (Crim) SECOND DEGREE MURDER
(1) Second degree murder is often called felony murder because
it involves a killing incidental to a felony. You may find the defend-
ant guilty of second degree murder if you are satisfied that the fol-
lowing five elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that - is dead;
Second, that (the defendant) (or) (an accomplice of the defend-
ant) killed him;
Third, that the killing was committed while the defendant was
(engaged) (or) (an accomplice) in (the commission of) (an attempt to
commit) (flight after committing or attempting to commit) the felony
of (robbery) (rape) (deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of
force) (arson) (burglary) (kidnapping);
Fourth, that the act of (the defendant) (or) (the defendant's ac-
complice) that killed - was done in furtherance of that fel-
ony; and
Ffth, that the killing was with malice on the part of the defend-
ant. Like all murders, second degree murder requires malice but
malice may be inferred if a defendant (engages) (or) (is an accom-
plice) in the commission or attempted commission of a felony dan-
gerous to human life such as No other proof of malice is
necessary.
(2) For persons to be accomplices in committing or attempting
to commit a felony they must have a common design, in other words,
a shared intent, to commit that felony.
(3) [I shall define (the felony of - ) (an attempt to com-
mit - ) for you shortly.] [(The felony of _ ) (an at-
tempt to commit ) may be defined as follows: - ]I
[To be guilty of ( ) (attempt to commit ) a de-
fendant must .]
Subcommittee Note
This instruction is appropriate when the defendant is charged
with second degree murder in violation of Crimes Code § 2502(b).
The parenthetical choices in subdivision (1) should be made in ac-
cordance with whether the defendant acted alone or with an accom-
plice and, if with an accomplice, the nature of their respective
involvement in the underlying felony and in the killing. The defini-
tion of "accomplice" in subdivision (2) should be sufficient for many
cases. However, elaboration may be needed in some cases, e.g.,
where the evidence raises questions about whether complicity ever
existed between the defendant and putative cofelon or was aban-
doned before the killing. For ideas, see Instruction 8.306A (liability
for conduct of accomplice); Commonwealth v. Lee, 484 Pa. 335, 399
A.2d 104 (1979) (Larsen, J. opinion in support of affirmance, defense
of abandonment and withdrawal). As subdivision (3) indicates the
court must at some point in its instructions give the jury an adequate
definition of the underlying felony or attempt.
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Crimes
Code has made no basic changes in the Pennsylvania law of felony
murder, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waters, - Pa. -, 418 A.2d 312
(1980); Commonwealth v. Allen, 475 Pa. 165, 379 A.2d 1335 (1977).
This instruction is derived from Crimes Code § 2502(b) as amended
by Act No. 39 (1978) and the case law, see, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Waters, supra (person other than slayer cannot be guilty of felony
murder unless a conspiratorial, te., a common design to commit the
underlying felony exists when slaying occurs and slayer's act causing
death is in furtherance of the felony); Commonwealth v. Legg, - Pa.
-, 417 A.2d 1152 (1980) (felony murder rule allows finder of fact to
infer killing was malicious from fact that actor engaged in a felony
of such a dangerous nature to human life as one of the statutorily
enumerated crimes); Commonwealth v. Allen, supra.
It may be noted that the Pennsylvania appellate decisions do
not always make it clear whether the imputation of malice from
commission of the underlying felony is a permissive inference, a con-
clusive presumption (rendering "malice" a superfluous element in
jury charges) or something in between, see, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Legg, supra, Commonwealth v. Allen, supra,- Commonwealth v. Lee,
484 Pa. 335, 399 A.2d 104 (1979) (Larsen, J. opinion in support of
affirmance). For felony murder the felony must not be an after-
thought, the intent to commit the felony must exist before the killing,
see Commonwealth v. Legg, supra. The fact that Crimes Code
§ 2502(b) defines second degree murder in terms of a "criminal
homicide" which Crimes Code § 2501(a) in turn defines to require
that the death was at least negligently caused apparently does not
change prior Pennsylvania law, e.g., that a felony-related death
which is in a sense accidental may still be felony murder, compare
Commonwealth v. Wite, - Pa. -, 415 A.2d 399 (1980); with Common-
wealth v. Allen, supra.
Felony murders other than those involving the felonies enumer-
ated in Section 2502(b) are murders of the third degree, see Common-
wealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958). A jury has the
power to fix the defendant's guilt at murder in the third degree even
though the only evidence in the case establishes that the killing was
committed in the perpetration of a § 2502(b) felony and the trial
court is required to so instruct the jury. See Commonwealth v. Mc-
Neal, 456 Pa. 394, 319 A.2d 669 (1974).
For a general discussion of felony murder, its history and ra-
tionale, see Commonwealth ex rel Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 438, 550
Pa. 218 (1970) (rejecting proximate cause as a basis of liability for
felony murder).
15.2502C (Crim) THIRD DEGREE MURDER
(1) According to the Crimes Code, any murder that is not first
or second degree murder is third degree murder. [Unless you are
returning a verdict of (first) (or) (second) degree murder, you] [You]
may find the defendant guilty of third degree murder if you are satis-
fied that the following three elements have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt:
First, that - is dead;
Second, that the defendant killed him; and
Third, that the killing was with malice. A killing is with malice
if it is without lawful justification, excuse or circumstances mitigat-
ing the killing to manslaughter and the killer acted with one of the
following states of mind: an intent to kill or an intent to inflict seri-
ous bodily harm or a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart,
cruelty, recklessness of consequences and a mind regardless of social
duty, indicating an unjustified disregard for the probability of death
or great bodily harm and an extreme indifference to the value of
human life.
(2) Malice may be either expressed by a defendant or inferred
from his words or conduct in the light of the attending circum-
stances. [When a deadly weapon is intentionally used against a vital
part of the human body, malice may be inferred to exist.]
Subcommittee Note
This instruction is appropriate for use when the defendant is
charged with third degree murder in violation of Crimes Code
§ 2502(c). Subdivisions (1) and (2) comprise instructions of general
applicability. The first bracket material of subdivision (1) may be
used when first or second degree murder are in issue. The definition
of malice in the third element of subdivision (1) may be omitted if
the court has given it earlier in the charge.
Subdivision (2) deals very generally with proof of malice from
the defendant's words, conduct and attending circumstances. De-
pending upon the evidence, it may be desirable to elaborate this part
of the charge. For cases upholding the inference of malice from the
intentional use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body, see,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 481 Pa. 495, 393 A.2d 13 (1978); Com-
monwealth v. Hinchclffi, 479 Pa. 551, 388 A.2d 1068 (1978). For a
sampling of other cases in which malice was inferrable from various
facts and circumstances, see Commonwealth v. Moore, - Pa. _, 412
A.2d 549 (1980) (whether malice inferrable from fist fight depends
upon circumstances including relative size and fighting ability of
parties, manner, ferocity and duration of attack, provocation, nature
of injuries); Commonwealth v. Steele, 448 Pa. 518, 295 A.2d 334
(1974) (violent punching and kicking which seriously damaged vic-
tim's liver and ribs); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 442 Pa. 365, 276
A.2d 530 (1970) (father beat child ruthlessly); Commonwealth v. Law-
rence, 428 Pa. 188, 236 A.2d 768 (1978) (defendant after knocking
victim out dragged him unconscious, half-naked and bleeding to an
isolated spot where he abandoned him on a cold winter night).
Some Pennsylvania decisions appear to equate the "intent to
kill" in the definition of malice with the "specific intent to kill" re-
quired for first degree murder, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pitts, 486
Pa. 212, 404 A.2d 1305 (1979). There are cases, however, where a
defendant as a factual matter has an intent, i.e., a purpose to kill
sufficient for malice that does not amount to a specific intent to kill.
Examples where such an intent may exist to permit conviction of
third degree murder include a defendant who kills in sudden passion
on inadequate provocation and a defendant who is incapable of pre-
meditation and deliberation because of drunkenness or diminished
capacity. In such cases a defendant's purposeful killing may be in-
tentional for malice purposes but his intent may not be sufficiently
formed or within his consciousness as to meet the legal standard for
specific intent. The problem about which we are talking is largely
one of semantics.
15.2503A (Crim) VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER-
MURDER IN ISSUE
(1) As my earlier definition of malice indicates, there can be no
malice when certain mitigating circumstances are present. When
those circumstances are present a killing may be manslaughter but
never murder. This is true when a defendant kills in heat of passion
following serious provocation or kills under an unreasonable mis-
taken belief in justifying circumstances.
(2) Accordingly, you can find malice only if you are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting [under
a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by
(the victim) (another person whom the defendant was trying to kill
when he negligently or accidentally killed the victim)] [or] [under an
unreasonable belief that the circumstances were such that, if they
existed, would have justified the killing.]
[(3) The term "passion" includes anger, rage, sudden resentment
or terror which renders the mind incapable of cool reflection. "Seri-
ous provication" is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a
reasonable person. (A provocation cannot be considered serious if
there is enough time between the provocation and killing so that the
passion of a reasonable person would have cooled.)]
[(4) (I shall instruct you shortly regarding the circumstances in
which a killing is justified.) (I instruct you that a killing is justified
when -_ .)]
(5) You may find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaugh-
ter [regardless of (any provocation or passion) (an unreasonable be-
lief in justifying circumstances)] if you are satisfied that the
following three elements have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt:
First, that - is dead:
Second, that the defendant killed him; and
Third, that the killing was with specific intent to kill (or inflict
serious bodily injury) and without lawful justification or excuse. [A
killing is with specific intent to kill (or seriously injure) if it is by a
person who has a fully formed intent to do so and who is conscious
of his own intent.]
Subcommittee Note
This instruction is appropriate whenever voluntary manslaugh-
ter in violation of Crimes Code § 2503 is a permissible verdict and
murder is also at issue under the charges. Subdivisions (1), (2) and
(5) comprise a basic instruction of general applicability. Subdivision
(3) may be used when further definitions of passion, provocation or
cooling time are needed. Subdivision (4) should be used when there
is an issue of unreasonable mistaken belief in justifying circum-
stances; the court must at some point in the instructions adequately
define the elements of the pertinent justification.
This instruction treats passion-provocation and imperfect justi-
fication (unreasonable mistaken belief in justifying circumstances) as
defensive matters. When they are raised the Commonwealth must
disprove them or it cannot win a conviction for murder. They are
not elements which the prosecution must prove to convict of volun-
tary manslaughter. For voluntary manslaughter, all the Common-
wealth need show is an intentional killing without justification or
excuse. Subdivisions (2) and (5) of the Instruction are derived from
Crimes Code § 2503. They reflect the defensive nature of some of
the statutorily defined elements of voluntary manslaughter. The pa-
renthesis in the third required element of voluntary manslaughter
around the phrase "or inflict serious bodily injury" shows subcom-
mittee uncertainty about Pennsylvania law on this point. The
Supreme Court has said that either an intent to kill or to seriously
injure is required for voluntary manslaughter, see Commonwealth v.
Mason, 474 Pa. 308, 379 A.2d 807 (1974). However, in the great
majority of its decisions the Supreme Court has said or suggested
that an intent to kill, which it sometimes equates to the specific intent
in first degree murder is essential, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pitts,
486 Pa. 212, 404 A.2d 1305 (1979); Commonwealth v. Gay, - Pa. -,
413 A.2d 675 (1980). Note that the language of Crimes Code
§ 2503(b) suggests that the mens rea in voluntary manslaughter is an
intentional or knowing killing. The subcommittee recommends that
trial judges adopt the cautious tactic of charging intent to injure only
on the request of defense counsel.
The definition of passion in subdivision (3) is derived from
Commonwealth v. Harris, 472 Pa. 406, 372 A.2d 757 (1977). The def-
inition of "serious provocation" is taken from Crimes Code § 2301.
The "cooling time" doctrine in subdivision (3), expressed in different
language, can be found in Commonwealth v. Long, 460 Pa. 461, 333
A.2d 865 (1975) (before sufficient time has elapsed for the blood to
cool and reason to reassume control of the actor's conduct). When a
jury is determining whether a defendant acted in passion they are
concerned with his subjective mental state; when deciding whether a
provocation was serious, i e., legally adequate, and cooling time was
insufficient, the jury is applying an objective standard, see Common-
wealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972). But see Com-
monwealth v. Potts, 468 Pa. 509, 406 A.2d 1007 (1979), in which a
majority of the court seems to undermine the objective nature of the
serious provocation requirement. For additional cases which may be
helpful to tbe court in deciding what issues should go to the jury and
in framing additional instructions on passion, provocation and cool-
ing time, see Commonwealth v. Whiteld, 475 Pa. 297, 380 A.2d 362
(1977) (cumulative impact of series of related events may add up to
adequate provocation; dispute over trivial household matters which
occurred half hour before stabbing was legally inadequate provoca-
tion); Commonwealth v. Berry, 461 Pa. 233, 336 A.2d 262 (1975) (in-
sulting and scandalous words are not adequate provocation; words
can be adequate provocation if they report a fact which if observed
would have constituted adequate provocation); Commonwealth v.
Dews, 429 Pa. 555, 239 A.2d 382 (1968) (defendant cannot seize
upon past injury or insult as provocation; cooling time sufficient as
matter of law where month passed between time defendant learned
victim had beat up his brother and the killing).
For a general exposition of imperfect justification reducing
murder to voluntary manslaughter and a potential source of instruc-
tions thereon, see Commonwealth v. Cain, 484 Pa. 240, 398 A.2d 1359
(1979) (killing in mistaken self-defense).
15.2503B (Crim) VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER-
MURDER NOT IN ISSUE
(1) In order to find the defendant guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter you must be satisfied that the following three elements
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that - is dead;
Second, that the defendant killed him; and
Third, that the killing was with specific intent to kill (or inflict
serious bodily injury) and without lawful justification or excuse. [A
killing is with a specific intent to kill (or seriously injure) if it is by a
person who has a fully formed intent to do so and who is conscious
of his own intent.]
[(2) I instruct you that a killing is not justifiable or excusable
merely because the killer (acts in passion after provocation) (unrea-
sonably believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed,
would justify the killing). Such facts may prevent a killing from be-
ing the more serious crime of murder, but they are no defense to a
charge of voluntary manslaughter.]
Subcommittee Note
This instruction is appropriate whenever voluntary manslaugh-
ter in violation of Crimes Code § 2503 is a permissible verdict and
murder is not in issue. The instruction follows from the premise that
passion-provocation and imperfect justification (unreasonable mis-
taken belief in justifying circumstances) are not elements of volun-
tary manslaughter in the conventional sense. They are defensive
matters which preclude malice and hence murder. Where murder is
not at issue, an instruction on passion-provocation or imperfect justi-
fication is superfluous.
The parenthesis in the third required element of voluntary man-
slaughter around the phrase "or inflict serious bodily injury" shows
subcommittee uncertainty about Pennsylvania law on this point.
The Supreme Court has said that either an intent to kill or to seri-
ously injure is required for voluntary manslaughter, see Common-
wealth v. Mason, 474 Pa. 308, 379 A.2d 807 (1974). However, in the
great majority of its decisions the Supreme Court has said or sug-
gested that an intent to kill, which it sometimes equates to the spe-
cific intent in first degree murder is essential, see, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Pitts, 486 Pa. 212, 404 A.2d 1305 (1979); Commonwealth v. Gay, -
Pa. -, 413 A.2d 675 (1980). Note that the language of Crimes Code
§ 2503(b) suggests that the mens rea in voluntary manslaughter is an
intentional or knowing killing. The subcommittee recommends that
trial judges adopt the cautious tactic of charging intent to injure only
on the request of defense counsel.
15.2504 (Crim) INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
(1) You may find the defendant guilty of involuntary man-
slaughter if you are satisfied that the following three elements have
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that - is dead;
Second, that the defendant's conduct was a direct cause of his
death; and
Third, that the defendant's conduct was reckless or grossly neg-
ligent.
(2) A defendant's conduct is reckless when he consciously disre-
gards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from
his conduct, the risk being such that it is grossly unreasonable for
him to disregard it. A defendant's conduct is grossly negligent when
he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death
will result from his conduct, the risk being such that it is grossly
unreasonable for him to fail to perceive, that is recognize, the risk. [I
shall now restate these definitions in more detail. A defendant's con-
duct is reckless or grossly negligent when-I am now speaking of
reckless conduct-the defendant is aware of and consciously disre-
gards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from
his conduct or when-I am now speaking of grossly negligent con-
duct-the defendant should be aware of such a risk even though he
does not actually perceive it. The risk of death must be of such a
nature and degree that the defendant's disregard of the risk or failure
to perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and
the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct or care that a reasonable person would observe
in the defendant's situation.]
[(3) As the definitions I just gave you indicate, the recklessness
or gross negligence required for involuntary manslaughter is a great
departure from the standard of ordinary care evidencing a disregard
for human life or an indifference to the possible consequences of
one's conduct.]
[(4) Compared with recklessness and gross negligence, the mal-
ice required for third degree murder is a more culpable, that is a
more blameworthy, state of mind. The essence of malice is an ex-
treme indifference to the value of human life.]
(5) In determining whether the defendant's conduct was reckless
or grossly negligent you should consider all the relevant facts and
circumstances that you find from the evidence including
Subcommittee Notes
Subdivision (1), the unbracketed portion of subdivision (2) and
subdivision (5) comprise an instruction of general applicability when
the defendant is charged with involuntary manslaughter in violation
of Crimes Code § 2504. Subdivision (5) should be tailored to point
out significant facts and circumstances as to which there is evidence
and which are relevant to recklessness or gross negligence. The
bracketed portion of subdivision (2) may be used for a more techni-
cally complete definition of reckless or grossly negligent conduct.
Subdivision (3) may be used if the court believes it may aid juror
understanding. Subdivision (4) may be used to avert possible juror
confusion as a result of similarity between definitions of reckless-
ness-gross negligence and malice.
Subdivision (1) is a paraphrase of Crimes Code § 2504 except
that the instruction does not refer to the concepts of "lawful act" and
"unlawful act." Liability does not in any way turn on the distinction
between lawful and unlawful acts. The only reason for referring to
the distinction in the Crimes Code appears to be to emphasize that
the lawful-unlawful act dichotomy no longer has any significance.
The definitions of recklessness and gross negligence in subdivision
(2) are derived from Crimes Code § 302(b)(3) and (b)(4). See Com-
monwealth v. Thomas, 482 Pa. 312, 393 A.2d 1122 (1978) (Pomeroy,
J. opinion in support of affirmance). The description of recklessness
and gross negligence in subdivision (3) is taken from Commonwealth
v. Polimem, 474 Pa. 430, 378 A.2d 1189, 1195 (1977). See also Com-
monwealth v. Agnew, - Pa. Super. Ct. _, 398 A.2d 209 (1979); Com-
monwealth v. Feinberg, 433 Pa. 558, 253 A.2d 636 (1969). For cases
supporting subdivision (4) see Commonwealth v. LaPorta, 218 Pa.
Super. Ct. 1, 272 A.2d 516 (1970) (culpability required for involun-
tary manslaughter is greater than tort negligence but less than mal-
ice); Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra (Pomeroy, J.) (extreme
indifference to the value of human life connotes malice).
It has been said that the pre-Crimes Code case law regarding
the definition of involuntary manslaughter has not been changed in
any substantial way by Crimes Code § 2504, see Commonwealth v.
Thomas, supra (Pomeroy, J.). The case law definition had evolved to
the point where involuntary manslaughter in all its forms required
two elements: recklessness or gross negligence and direct causation,
Commonwealth v. Feinberg, supra (defendant merchant guilty of in-
voluntary manslaughter in death of skid row bums who consumed
sterno that he sold them ostensibly for use as a fuel); Commonwealth
v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961). Differences in the stan-
dard of liability for lawful act and unlawful act manslaughter were
disappearing, see Commonwealth v. Clouser, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 1208,
239 A.2d 870 (1968) (automobile case; proof of unlawful act is not
per se sufficient for conviction of involuntary manslaughter). Thus
the pre-Crimes Code case law, particularly the more recent cases, are
still very pertinent when interpreting Crimes Code § 2504.
All facts and circumstances relevant to the definition of reck-
lessness and gross negligence in subdivision (2) are of course relevant
to guilt. The fact that the act of the defendant violated the Motor
Vehicle Code while not itself sufficient, may together with surround-
ing circumstances evidence disregard for human life or an indiffer-
ence to consequences, see Commonwealth v. Agnew, supra and cases
cited therein. Although contributory negligence is not a defense, the
actions of the victim must be considered along with the other facts
and circumstances in determining whether the defendant's conduct
was (i) reckless or grossly negligent, and (ii) the direct cause of the
victim's death, see Commonwealth v. Feinberg, supra; Commonwealth
v. Clouser, supra; Commonwealth v. LaPorta, supra.

